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The imaginaries of RuNet: the change of the elites and the 
construction of online space 
Gregory Asmolov1, Polina Kolozaridi2 
                                                Abstract 
By exploring the changes among online elites who have constructed the Internet, this article 
traces the unique history of the Russian Internet (RuNet). Illustrating how changes in online 
elites can be associated with changes in the socio-political role of the online space in 
general, it concludes that, although the Internet is of global nature, its space is constructed 
on the level of nation, culture and language. To show this, the article presents five stages in 
the development of RuNet, suggesting that the change in the stages is associated with the 
relationship of power between, first, actors (users, developers, the government, etc.) that 
construct Internet space and, second, alternative elites that emerge online and the traditional 
elites that seek to take the online space under their control by making their imaginary 
dominate.  
Keywords: RuNet; Internet elites; Internet imaginaries, social construction of technology, 
Internet regulation, Internet historiography 
 
Introduction 
On 29 April 2011, Dmitry Medvedev, then president of Russia, hosted a 
meeting with representatives of the Russian Internet community.3 The list of people 
who were invited to take a part in the discussion included representatives of Russian 
and international Internet companies and projects (including Facebook and the 
Wikimedia Foundation), well-known bloggers, journalists and online media editors, 
representatives of Internet governance organizations and representatives of 
independent citizen-based projects. Four and a half years later, on 22 December 
2015, President Putin hosted a meeting of a similar nature. However, this time the 
title of the meeting and the list of participants were substantially different. The 
‘Meeting with representatives of the national IT-industry’ included only one person 
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who had taken part in the 2011 meeting (the head of Mail.ru Dmitry Grishin). The 
rest of the participants represented Russian IT organizations, including search 
engines, domain providers and security companies.4 
 The difference in the composition of the two meetings is significant; it 
illustrates which people the state regards as playing a key role in the Internet space. 
However, the meaning of this change as well as other changes in the type of actors 
playing a lead part in constructing the social and political role of the national 
cyberspace has yet to be conceptualized and analyzed. We approach these groups 
of actors as ‘Internet elites’. These groups can be composed of varying types of 
actors, e.g. there are the ‘elites’ who dominate Internet traffic, which include bloggers 
and viral video personalities; and the ‘elites’ who interface between the state and the 
Internet and IT developers. At different periods different types of actors can be 
considered as Internet elites. Given the diversity of actors with the potential to be 
considered co-constructors of the Internet within specific socio-political contexts, it is 
imperative that the Internet elites be conceptualized to deepen our understanding of 
the development of RuNet, as well as the history of the Internet more generally. 
The history of the Internet is a popular research topic; this is reflected in the 
number of studies produced in recent years. However, as we note in the literature 
review section, much of this literature deals with the history of the development of 
the Internet as a technology, not with the socio-political role of these technologies 
within the context of specific countries and languages. We argue that to explore the 
history of the Internet in a particular socio-political and cultural segment of 
cyberspace, we need to focus on the emergence of the Internet elites and to trace 
how these change. The history of RuNet development offers case for such an 
investigation.  
We argue that although various aspects of RuNet history are well-covered, 
not enough attention has yet been dedicated to the dynamics of RuNet development 
as a cultural and socio-political project. We explore the development of RuNet by 
juxtaposing literature about the social construction of the Internet with Internet 
historiography and theories of elites. Our conceptual framework approaches the 
development of national Internet segments as a social construction that can be 
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associated with changes in the Internet elites, as well as changes in the power 
relationships between different members of the elites including individual actors (e.g. 
users) and institutional actors (e.g. government). 
Background: key issues in studies of RuNet. 
Studies of Russian informational networks tend to date their inception from 
Soviet cybernetics as a part of the Soviet planned economy.5 Peters explores how 
early development of a Soviet nationwide computer network (All-State Automated 
System), which was inspired by ‘a utopian vision of [a] distinctly state socialist 
information society’, failed due to ‘the institutional conditions supporting the scientific 
knowledge and the command economy’.6 That said, most research examines the 
Russian Internet as a part of the current global Internet network starting from the late 
1980s.   
As an object of investigation, the Russian Internet poses a conceptual 
challenge. The Russian Internet is often called RuNet, a term that acknowledges it 
serves not only as a national domain but also a language domain, open to Russian-
speaking people from all over the world.7 RuNet has been studied as a complex 
phenomenon consisting of several key themes. These themes include, among 
others, the technological infrastructure and development of the Internet8; the role of 
the Internet for the emergence of new communities and cultural spaces9; the political 
role of the Internet including political mobilization and the empowerment of 
activists 10 ; and the state’s policies in regard to the Internet with a focus on 
governance and regulation.11 
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One point of debate in the literature about RuNet is its contribution to the 
development of political freedom in Russia. This debate addresses the question of 
the extent to which the development of the Internet in Russia has followed the state’s 
interests or, rather, has presented an alternative to state power. Scholars in this field 
tend either to optimism or pessimism. Cyber optimists explore how the Internet 
empowers activists and challenges traditional actors, including the media and state 
institutions; cyber pessimists question ‘technological optimism’ and the capacity of 
RuNet to challenge traditional political actors.12 Some scholars highlight that from the 
outset RuNet presented an alternative information network, beyond the control of 
traditional political institutions, while pre-Internet networks like FIDOnet offered a 
space for development of informal communities of users in the final years of USSR.13 
On the other hand, there are debates about whether the Internet re-enforces the 
state’s surveillance capabilities and whether RuNet constitutes an influential public 
sphere with a real influence on offline politics or, rather, a technology that diminishes 
the scale of offline activism.14 
These debates also question the extent to which the community of Internet 
users in Russia has ever represented the Russian population at large, and at what 
period of time this occurred. For instance, Alexanyan maintains that RuNet has given 
rise to a different type of imagined community of Russian citizens, distinguishing 
‘between “Internet Russia” and “TV Russia”’.15 Facebook is claimed to be an ‘echo 
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chamber’ for protest action, and social networking is an alternative to television 
consumption.16 Other scholars, by contrast, oppose the distinction drawn between 
online and offline worlds. According to Gorny, the ‘Russian blogosphere reproduces 
fundamental structural features of Russian society such as social atomization and 
negative attitudes to[wards] official institutions’17.  
The role of the state in shaping and regulating RuNet is a popular research 
topic. The key themes here are state censorship, e-government and other digital 
initiatives, state-sponsored hacktivism, Internet-related legislation and security. 
Deibert and Rohozinski have explored the different Internet control regimes including 
denying access to online content and filtering; ‘legal and normative environment and 
technical capabilities that enable state actors to deny access to information 
resources’; counter information campaigns; and enhancement of jurisdiction over 
national cyberspace.18 
Some scholars periodize RuNet development. Vlad Strukov divides the 
development of Russian digital networks into two periods: 1985-1995 and 1995-
2005.19 He links the development of Russian computing technologies to the political 
transformation of the USSR into Russia, to the technological and social processes 
that changed the Internet from a technology of ‘elites’ to a technology of ‘masses’ 
and to the cultural shift from collective to collaborative usage. Kuznetsov traces 
RuNet history as the shift from the alternative cultural and anarchist space of the 
early adopters to a more commercialized Internet and business-oriented structure.20 
Most research into RuNet historiography, however, has paid limited attention to the 
factors explaining the transformations in the Russian online environment. The 
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purpose of our theoretical framework is to enable examination of these 
transformations. 
Theoretical approaches to exploring Internet histories 
This section situates our examination of RuNet within the context of different 
approaches to the historical investigation of the Internet’s development. Some 
approaches investigate the history of the Internet as a technological development21, 
others regard it as a media development.22  The social, political and institutional 
aspects of the origins of the Internet have attracted particular attention. For instance, 
the Internet is seen either as a scientific or as a military innovation. 23  Another 
approach suggests focusing not only on the actors who participated in the 
development of technologies, but also exploring different perceptions of the Internet 
by deploying the concept of the social construction of technologies.24 The concept of 
the shaping of technologies focuses on a particular aspect of construction and 
argues that to understand how technologies are shaped we should look into social, 
political and economic values.25 
Gillespie highlighted that the design of the Internet is associated with 
discursive construction, observing that: ‘every technology is shaped by a process of 
social definition, in which those invested in it struggle not only to implement the 
technology, but also to narrate what it is and what it is for’26. Accordingly, to trace the 
history of the Internet development we need to undertake a discursive analysis of the 
vision of the Internet and the process of negotiation that took place between different 
actors around the question: “What is the Internet?”. Abbate maintains that the 
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development of the Internet should be examined within the context of how the value 
of technological innovation is viewed by different actors.27 
Flichy introduced the notion of ‘Internet imaginaries’, arguing that the 
‘imaginaire is at the center of design and use of the Internet’.28  He posits that 
Internet development is driven by different types of myth and utopian visions about 
the role of information technologies in and for society, which can, in turn, become 
projects. The myths and utopias are rooted in discourses that propose ‘a framework 
of interpretation and action for network computing” and show “what could be done 
with the Internet and how’.29 Flichy highlighted how the dialectic nature of technology 
development was the outcome of the tension between an ideology that seeks to 
preserve a social order and a utopia that seeks to disrupt it. Mansell proposed the 
examination of how the Internet is imagined within a context of the imaginaries of the 
information society.30 She suggests applying the concept of social imaginaries to 
explore the development of the Internet as a relationship between alternative 
imaginaries as ‘different ways of seeing’ the Internet, which represent different 
values, and the relationship of power between the actors that share these 
imaginaries.31 She defines imaginaries as ‘the way people in the information society 
make sense of their visions and practices and how this is influencing the 
communication system that is so central to people’s lives’.32  
The actors participating in the development and promotion of imaginaries may 
include hackers or counter-culture and cyber-culture activists.33 Guice suggests that 
there is a need to add users, administrators, moderators and designers to the list of 
actors who construct the online-space.34 He distinguishes between the architect’s 
retrospective on Internet history and the users’ point of view; the former relies on 
technical and official documents whilst the latter involves actors who are ‘stimulating 
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new applications and new directions of technical development for the engineers’.35 
Hauben suggested that the actors that participate in the development of the Net are 
not restricted by any sovereign boundaries and hence calls them ‘netizens’. 36 
Mansell emphasized the need to take into consideration the ‘perceptions and 
experiences of everyday users, software developers, and other stakeholders in the 
development of the communication system’.37 In the light of the above, the purpose 
of our conceptual framework is to enable an investigation of the historiography of 
RuNet as a series of changes in Internet imaginaries and the relationships between 
actors that can be associated with these imaginaries, without excluding any type of 
potential actors.  
 
Conceptual framework: construction of the Internet and the 
circulation of Internet elites   
The history of online space can be explored through the investigation of 
people who have shaped the Internet space either through technological 
development or/and through policy making or/and by its usage. We use the term 
‘Internet elites’ to identify the different groups that play a part in the social 
construction of the Internet. Internet elites can be conceptualized in different ways; 
first, as the most significant hubs and content producers in online social networks; 
second, as the most influential designers and architects of platforms; and, third, as 
those who have the power to shape policies affecting the regulation of the Internet.38 
There is an inherent paradox in the notion of the ‘Internet elites’ given that formerly 
various online networks and communities were underground and counter-elitist 
actors. Moreover, a focus on elites suggests a focus on single actors, while Internet 
research literature tends to approach the Internet as a space for collective actors, 
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e.g. networks, crowds and communities.39 Hence, to address these contradictions, 
the notion of elites requires clarification.  
 Elite theories have variously approached and defined ‘elites’ as actors 
controlling resources, occupying key positions and relating to each other through 
power networks40 and as those who possess the material and/or symbolic resource 
to manifest power over others.41 The literature also distinguishes between different 
types of elites including business elites, military elites, media elites, state 
administrative, religious elites and others according to what particular power 
resources the group shares.42 Here, the economic and political power of specific 
actors dealing with the Internet, as well as their different forms of social and cultural 
capital, can operate as an indicator for exploring Internet elites.43 The investigation of 
changes in the elites is addressed as a ‘circulation of elites […] where elites are 
overturned by other elites’.44 
In this paper, we are interested in elites as groups that have the resources to 
develop, promote and implement their imaginary of technology, in this case, that of 
the Internet. Following Flichy and Mansel we define Internet imaginaries as a way of 
seeing the social, political and cultural role of the Internet as well as the utopian 
vision of how the Internet can offer alternative ways of being, contribute to social 
change and challenge existent socio-political reality. Viewing the Internet as a 
process of social construction can help resolve some of the controversies that 
trouble the notion of ‘Internet elites’; it does this by defining the elites as those single 
or collective actors who take an active part in the social construction of the Internet 
space through the mobilization of their resources. Accordingly, we conceptualize the 
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Internet elites as a group of actors that take an active part in the social construction 
of the Internet within a specific socio-political and cultural context.  
The emergence of the Internet, however, presents a special case for an 
examination of who can be considered as an elite since the Internet can be 
approached not only as a technology, but also an as alternative socio-political space 
which needs to be differentiated from the traditional offline political domain. The early 
adopters of the Internet claimed that the Internet was an independent space for a 
counter-culture, that it stood in opposition to the traditional power structure and 
offered equal communication.45 Flichy also points out that the Internet is a potential 
resource for the growth of disruptive political utopias.46 In this context, the Internet 
can be considered not only as a constructed technology, but also as a space for the 
emergence of counter-elites.  
In contrast to the literature focused on the shaping of technology, we do not 
consider the values of different actors, but instead argue that the construction of the 
Internet is an outcome of the relationship of power between actors who hold different 
values. Accordingly, we analyze not the values that drive the actors but the 
relationships between actors that can be associated with different imaginaries. The 
struggle between different imaginaries of the Internet has a dynamic nature. 
Accordingly, the circulation of the Internet elites is examined in the light of changes 
in power relations between traditional and counter-elites. These groups may rely on 
different resources, e.g. technological knowledge, economic capital or political 
influence, which support the symbolic capabilities enabling the construction of the 
Internet within a specific socio-political context. Accordingly, the historiography of the 
Internet needs to follow the transformation of Internet elites and the changes in the 
dominant Internet imaginaries.  
 
Methodological framework  
Our analysis seeks to explore the development of RuNet as a relationship 
between different elites who propose different imaginaries of the Internet and the 
change in the Internet elites. We are particularly interested in two questions: first, 
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what type of elites are successful in promoting and implementing their imaginaries of 
the Internet; second, what are the major tensions between different imaginaries at 
different periods of time. The purpose of the analysis is to identify the following: the 
major developmental stages, including the dominant Internet imaginaries; the 
dominant actors who can be considered as Internet elites; and the tensions between 
groups of actors.  
Research into the changes in Internet elites can deploy various methods. For 
example, research may focus on the online ratings of popular content-producers and 
websites; it can explore the structure of the ownership of popular online platforms; it 
may analyze media to map Internet-related agendas; and it can follow the structure 
of membership of organizations that address Internet related policies. Internet elites 
can also be considered as network hubs which can be investigated using social 
network analysis. Exploring the business side of Internet elites requires that 
economic and financial data be taken into account. Our paper, however, presents a 
preliminary attempt to study the historiography of national and cultural segments with 
a focus on a change in the actors associated with dominant Internet imaginaries. 
Accordingly, our aim is to test this conceptual framework by reinterpreting an existing 
body of research into the Russian Internet. 
 The analysis seeks to identify periods in RuNet development marked by a 
change of Internet elite. For that purpose, we have conducted a top-down thematic 
analysis of the existing literature about RuNet.47 In identifying themes we have built 
on the conceptual frameworks of those studies that introduced the notion of the 
Internet imaginarie; we understand Internet elites to be actors who construct and 
promote their imaginaries; we focus attention on the relationship of power between 
these actors; and we define periods according to a change in the type of elite. We 
analyze the data in terms of the following five themes and key questions: 
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Theme Key questions 
Imaginaries 
What are the dominant imaginaries in the development of the 
Internet? 
What are the alternative (latent) imaginaries? 
Actors 
Who are the major actors that play an active part in the construction 
of dominant imaginaries and who opposes these imaginaries? 
What types of actors (Institutional/ individual) are associated with 
Internet imaginaries?  
What type of resources are associated with different type of actors? 
Platforms What digital platforms are used by the actors to implement the 
imaginaries? 
Relationships What are the major tensions/conflicts between the actors around 
imaginaries? 
Circulation/ 
transition 
What is the major change in the dominant imaginaries and the 
Internet elites compared with the previous period? 
Table 1 Thematic framework for analysis of RuNet development 
 
The stages of RuNet development 
Drawing on thematic analysis of the literature, we have identified five periods 
marked by changes in RuNet elites and a shift in dominant imaginaries of RuNet.  
 
Stage 1: The 1980s and earlier. Cyber-USSR 
The first stage that we have identified is the scientific-technical stage. At this 
stage, there are two major groups of actors that can be associated with the 
development of the Internet. On the one hand, the development of the Internet was 
driven by a group of scientists who used it to support research-related collaboration. 
On the other hand, developers played a leading role. Both groups can be considered 
as creators and early adopters of the online space. The online space was dominated 
13 
by mailing lists (UseNet groups) and networks for communication between Bulletin 
Board Systems (e.g. FidoNet) which were initially used by communities of the first 
adopters including scientists, developers and engineers.48 
According to Kuznetzov, two events that took place in 1990 mark the 
beginning of RuNet: first, the registration of the .su domain and, second, the creation 
of the computer network Relcom/Demos. Kuznetzov regards the members of the 
Kurchatov Institute to be the first Soviet Internet users to own e-mail accounts and 
observes that access to the Internet was limited by access to the modems of 
research centers.49 However, while the early origins of the Internet can be linked to 
the Soviet ideological vision of cybernetics as a mechanism to build an efficient 
society, the informational networks of the early 1990s challenged the role of 
traditional institutions. They provided a space for the development of informal 
communities, contacts with foreigners, and contributed to democratization.  
The early RuNet was also linked to the political change that took place in the 
USSR in the late 1980s, including the concepts of Perestroika and Glasnost.  
Kuznetzov recalls that it was hoped that the Internet would overcome the 
‘informational iron curtain’.50 There is some evidence that Relcom/Demos network 
was a key source of independent information during the August coup in 1991.51 
Interestingly, one of the first Russian providers was called the ‘Glasnost Network’. 
This provider opened access to the Internet to people beyond the scientific and 
technical communities. These new users started to shape the early RuNet.  
To sum up, at the first stage the dominant imaginary of RuNet can be 
associated with a development of online communities among a group of experts, 
particularly scientists and geeks. There is also some evidence that suggests that 
RuNet was thought to be a space of and for free communication that breached 
borders and brought down political walls in the spirit of political transformation as a 
part of the broader collapse of the USSR. There is no evidence of significant tension 
between different imaginaries at this period, nor of conflicts between different groups 
of actors. The ideological and centralized vision of the Internet associated with the 
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communist ideological outlook did not play a substantial role in development of 
RuNet. The online space was dominated by early adopters who were at the same 
time the developers and the users of this space. 
 
Stage 2: The late 1990s. The Internet as a space of cultural elites 
In the middle of the 1990s, RuNet moved beyond online groups for 
communication within the communities of early adopters to website platforms that 
offered online content for any user. These were either media projects (e.g. 
zhurnal.ru) or cultural projects that provided a space for literature, poetry and art. 
According to Kuznetzov, literature was the central issue for RuNet between 1995-
1998.52 This encapsulated the idea of the Internet as samizdat, archive and library.53 
Early adopters at this stage were primarily content creators and people who were 
involved in cultural production, including journalists, writers, poets, scholars, artists 
and designers.  
This group's active engagement with a new space can be also considered as 
part of the experimentation and development of this space. RuNet as a user-
generated space enabled humanitarian scholars and writers to introduce new 
cultural experiments which took the form of the first web-journals and online 
community activity.54 Some argued that the Internet as hypertext was the future of 
literature.55 Some users approached the Internet not only as an alternative cultural 
space, but also as a zone of ‘limitless freedom’ and anarchy, which was manifested 
in projects such as Libertarium: ‘All these ideas shared some type of utopian vision 
and the faith that the model of unselfish cooperation online would be viable’.56 
Another field of experiment was the media. RuNet provided space not only for 
media organizations, but also for individual journalists (among the Russian-Israeli 
journalist Anton Nossik), whose personal journalism laid the foundation for personal 
blogging, a dominant feature of RuNet in early 2000s. This stage was marked by a 
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high degree of user self-reflexivity. The journalists who used the Internet were 
primarily writing about what was happening online. As pointed out by Kuznetzov: 
‘The Russian Internet was so small at that time, that the appearance of any new 
page was an event’.57 This self-reflexivity was also present in scientific publications 
by scholars like Gorny and Leibov. 
Several influential users, like Nossik, were initially not based in Russia. The 
term ‘RuNet’ was invented in Israel by an emigrant from Baku who worked for the 
Russian-language Israeli-based media.58 Emigrants were particularly active among 
the early adopters since the Internet allowed people who had emigrated from the 
former USSR to stay in touch and share a cultural and language space with their 
fellows in Russia. By the late 1990s RuNet offered a space to a global Russian-
speaking network society.  
At the end of the 1990s the growth of the Internet was fast enough to attract 
the attention of the non-user community. An alternative interpretation of the role of 
the Internet emerged: 
In the first publications the Internet was presented as an archive of 
pornography, a space that was inhabited by hackers, racists and xenophobes. 
[…] In that sense, Internet construction relied on the same arguments as a 
construction of the image of the ‘alien’ in a society – a foreigner, a stranger, a 
mad person.59 
In addition to being a space of ‘pornography and fascists’, the Internet also 
started to be seen as a threat to offline actors and institutions including traditional 
media and business. This was the first time that a contradiction between two 
imaginaries of the Internet emerged: the Internet as an alternative socio-cultural 
space and the Internet as an antisocial underground. At this stage, the line 
demarcating those who represented different imaginaries separated Internet users 
from the non-users.  
Around 2000 Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the pro-Kremlin Fund of Effective 
Politics (FEP), conducted the first political experiments with online technologies 
around the 2000 presidential elections. The development of major online media, 
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starting with Gazeta.ru, and the participation of major business actors contributed to 
the gradual politicization of the online space. With the first election of Putin as 
president, the Internet became a topic of major discussion among politicians. In 1999 
Putin, then prime-minister, organized his first meeting with representatives of the 
Internet community. At that meeting people considered to be the leaders of RuNet at 
that time blocked the minister of communication's, Lesin’s, proposal to increase the 
role of the state in the regulation of the Internet.60 
Another event that marked the transition towards a new type of elite and new 
imaginaries of RuNet was the emergence of the Livejournal blogosphere platform, 
first used in Russian in 1999. Podshibiakin cites Goralik who described the first two 
years of LiveJournal as: ‘a touching time when only 40-50 people were writing in 
Russian, everyone was introduced, welcomed and people added to friends almost 
anyone’.61 According to Podshibiakin, at that time, Russian LiveJournal conjured up 
the image of a ‘Soviet kitchen’. 62  The Internet as alternative space for 
communication was also compared to a ‘domestic kitchen’ ‘in which philosophical 
and political debates took place’.63 That said, the Livejournal’s ‘kitchen’ gradually 
started to open up and attract more members of the public. While initially users could 
only join Livejournal through personal invitation, in December 2003 Livejournal 
cancelled the ‘invite-only’ requirement, which opened the platform for more people to 
join and simplified the generation of content for mass users.  
To sum up, during the second stage the imaginary of the Internet as an 
alternative cultural, social and political space was developed and promoted through 
usage by early nontechnical adopters including journalists, writers, social scientists, 
etc. At the same time, this was a relatively small community and a group of people 
with a relatively dense offline network of connections. These elites approached the 
Internet as a space for experiment driven by their visions of the Internet. That said, 
this was also a time when the Internet space started to attract the attention of 
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political institutions and a broad offline audience; this eventually lead to the 
emergence of new tensions, which can be seen in the next stages 
 
Stage 3: The 2000s. An alternative media space and networked public 
sphere  
Livejournal was one of the most popular platforms for user-generated content 
in RuNet in the 2000s. Popular bloggers became known as ‘tysyachniki’ [Russian 
diminutive for ‘the thousands’], blog owners with more than 1000 followers. The 
number of ‘followers’ became a key indicator of online popularity. The members of 
Internet elites that had emerged during the previous stage numbered among the 
‘tysyachniki’ and came first in the popularity ratings. However, many new actors 
joined this group of popular users, including well-known journalists from traditional 
media, celebrities, politicians and mainstream writers, as well as ‘anonims’ (people 
who wrote without disclosing their identity). Some politicians were early adopters, 
while others joined later.64 Unlike during previous stages, when the Internet was 
dominated by cultural elites little-known to a broad public offline, but dominant online, 
now a range of offline media, cultural, business and political (both oppositional and 
state-affiliated) elites offline, started to occupy the online space. 
As highlighted by Podshibiakin, what was special about Livejournal was that 
“almost everyone there was a source of newsworthy information”.65  People who 
could be considered newsmakers started to use blogs, as well as activists who used 
their blogs for different types of campaigning. With the rise of ‘newsworthy’ bloggers 
and investigative journalists, in the second half of 2000s, Livejournal started to set 
the news agenda. Marina Litvinovich, a former consultant for Pavlovsky’s Fund for 
Effective Politics and a liberal blogger, argued that Livejournal enabled the creation 
of ‘blog-waves’. According to Litvinovich, these can generate a ‘massive networking 
campaign’ when an issue raised by a particular blog starts to proliferate online and 
reaches traditional media.66 For instance, it was LiveJournal blogs that triggered a 
broad anti-police campaign and the ‘Blue buckets’ campaign against Russian 
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officials who abused usage of emergency signals on their cars.67 Blogs also started 
to be used to conduct independent investigations into (and against) corruption (e.g. 
as carried out by Aleksey Navalny, Russia’ s most prominent opposition activist).  
Research undertaken by the Berkman Centre suggested that the Russian 
blogosphere at that time could be considered a ‘networked public sphere’.68 The 
Berkman research highlighted that the Russian blogosphere offered alternative 
frameworks for discussing news and politics, and an alternative to broadcast and 
print media.69 Scholars identified the ‘occurrence of bottom-up agenda setting' in 
mainstream media.70 The researchers also highlighted RuNet’s ‘watchdog function’ 
which ‘…identif[ied] problems of common concern and coming together online to 
push back against abuses of the state or powerful corporate interests’.71  Gorny 
argued that unlike traditional media, ‘the Russian blogosphere remains a place of 
free speech and uncensored discussion’.72  
Research suggests that the blogosphere as an alternative media space posed 
a challenge to the traditional political and media elites, though these elites also tried 
to engage with the online space. That said, Toepfl, who examined a number of 
scandals that started online through social media, questioned online users’ capacity 
to pose a threat to the traditional ruling elites. He concluded that ‘Russia’s ruling 
elites are currently very much capable of managing public outrage arising from the 
new sphere of social media according to their specific political aims’.73 
Interestingly, by the middle of the 2000s, popularity measurement had 
become an important feature of RuNet. Several ratings, including the Yandex blog 
rating, were used to identify the most popular bloggers and to measure the 
significance of specific topics. Ratings played an important role in defining online 
                                                 
67
 For more details, see, Samuel Greene, Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s 
Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 167-202. 
68
 Etling, “Public discourse in the Russian blogosphere”. 
69
 Karina Alexanyan, Vladimir Barash, Bruce Etling et al, “Exploring Russian cyberspace: Digitally-
mediated collective action and the networked public sphere”, Berkman Center Research Publication, 
no. 2012-2 (2012), available at 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Exploring_Russian_Cyberspace_2012.pdf, 
accessed 16 December 2016.  
70
 Ibid., 6. 
71
 Ibid., 7. 
72
 Gorny, “Understanding the Real Impact of Russian Blogs”: 9. 
73
 Florian Toepfl, “Managing public outrage: Power, scandal, and new media in contemporary 
Russia”, New Media & Society 13 no. 8 (2011): 1314. 
19 
elites. The Yandex rating was, however, later closed. This can be approached as a 
struggle not only around the visibility of certain content, but also about who are 
considered to be the online leaders, through control over the mechanisms that 
provide indicators of popularity.  
To summarize, the third stage is associated with a substantial increase in the 
number of Internet users and the first efforts by the traditional offline elites to adopt 
online space. This stage displayed a shift in the imaginary of RuNet from an elitist 
cultural and community space to an imaginary of RuNet as space for an alternative 
agenda and framing of events, as well as a politicized public sphere. This was also 
the first time that significant competition between different type of elites became 
visible, particularly around agenda setting and the media framing of events. There 
ensued a struggle between traditional media/state-affiliated elites and the alternative 
elites that had emerged online. 
 
Stage four: The 2010s. Networked and connected action 
Fossato et al argued that ‘the liberation promise’ heralded by the Internet had 
been limited in Russia, and they criticized RuNet for failing to bring about political 
change and increase political participation.74 In the late 2000s RuNet nevertheless 
displayed ‘growing use of digital platforms in social mobilization and civic action’. 
This political mobilization was not necessary associated with NGOs or any political 
organization, but rather with ‘issue-based campaign[s]’ initiated by Internet users.75 
This type of mobilization resembles the notion of ‘connected action’, that is, when the 
Internet facilitates collective action without any organizational framework.76 
One of the most significant cases of digital media civic mobilization was the 
response to wildfires in 2010. 77  This was the first time that RuNet users used 
crowdsourcing platforms to coordinate mobilization. In the same year, 2010, 
crowdsourcing platforms started to be used to monitor urban problems, including 
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potholes (the first project was initiated by Alexey Navalny), and in the struggle 
against corruption.78  Unlike those who see the Internet as a public sphere that 
provides an online space for discussion and information sharing, activism required 
an offline type of activity including user participation in data collection and the 
solution of specific problems.  
One of the first instances when RuNet was used for political protests occurred 
during the so-called Twitter revolution in Moldova in 2009. On a more mass scale, 
RuNet was used for political mobilization in the winter of 2011-2012. Social 
networks, crowdsourcing platforms and dedicated websites were employed to 
monitor electoral fraud and to coordinate different type of offline activity and protest 
against the rigging of both the parliamentary and presidential elections.79 One of the 
most successful Facebook event pages was created by a journalist, Ilya Klishin, to 
call a protest at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow on 10 December 2011. More than 
35,000 people joined the event page.80 Two months later a platform was developed 
to facilitate the ‘White Circle’ protest where people created a live chain to surround 
the centre of Moscow. A crowdsourcing platform ‘Map of Violations’ 
(kartanarusheniy.ru) was launched by the election monitoring NGO Golos to monitor 
election fraud.  
All the above cases illustrate instances of political innovation by RuNet 
users. 81  The political innovators were those individuals who introduced novel 
practices on RuNet to facilitate various form of social and political action, which 
included both the development of new platforms and innovative usage of these 
platforms for various forms of mobilization. They can be considered as the RuNet 
elites who shaped a RuNet imaginary through their practices. This type of elite also 
includes the moderators of the big online groups and event pages on social 
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networking websites who controlled the proliferation of information among target 
audiences.  
One can argue that the growing role of the Internet for mobilization can be 
also associated with a change in the type of dominant platforms; these shifted from 
being platforms for the generation of content by users to platforms for social 
interaction. While the third stage suggested the dominant role of Livejournal, now we 
can see an increase in the popularity of social networks, including Vkontakte and 
Facebook. Alexanyan had noted as early as 2004 that ‘the locus of online social 
activity in Russia may be shifting from blogs and blog/social network hybrids to pure 
social networking sites’. 82  However, the socio-political role of social networking 
websites would be a later development in RuNet. The increasing role of social 
networks can be linked to a process of polarization between the online and the 
offline communities. Bodrunova and Litvinenko argue that ‘the Russian Facebook 
segment formed an echo chamber’ 83  which became disconnected from other 
Russian communities and political groups. 
The fourth stage of RuNet development presents a shift from Internet as a 
space of alternative content to Internet as a space of social and political mobilization. 
As highlighted by Koltsova and Shcherbak, ‘political activity on the Internet is not 
simply an online projection of offline political activity: it can itself provoke activity in 
offline political life’.84 Unlike the imaginary of the RuNet as a public sphere, in this 
next case the Internet is not only a sphere for discussion, but a set of political 
instruments used for offline impact. However, active political innovation that 
facilitated connective actions and the emergence of a new generation of online 
leaders who used RuNet to organize offline activism, generated a new conflict.85 
This time, the RuNet elites seemed to present a significant political threat to 
traditional political elites, either through challenging the legitimacy of elections or 
through their capacity to facilitate large scale political action. The increasing 
awareness that RuNet presented a political threat marked the beginning of a new 
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stage of RuNet development; this saw a significant increase in state-led regulation of 
online space.  
 
Stage five: The Internet under state control 
As early as the 2011-2012 electoral cycle the Russian authorities began 
restricting oppositional activist activity. This included DDoS [Distributed Denial of 
Service] attacks on media and crowdsourcing projects, new legal regulations as well 
as the prosecution of selected activists. The founder of Vkontakte, Pavel Durov, 
publically refused a FSB request to disclose information about political activists who 
used Vkontakte. A couple of years later he had to sell his business and leave 
Russia.  
Anna Klyueva argues that events of the winter 2011-2012 were a ‘turning 
point’ in the development of the socio-political role of RuNet. ‘[T]he successes of the 
protest movement initiated a government crackdown on the Russian Internet and 
social media’, she maintains, ‘with the Russian government actively seeking to tame 
and control online communicative processes through a set of laws regulating online 
activity, increasing the presence of government and pro-government forces online, 
and fostering self-censorship’. She concludes that ‘the pro-government actors were 
able to monopolize and control the public sphere with their issues and messages, 
eliminating rational debate and thus limiting the functioning public sphere essential 
for a fully functioning society’.86 Seva Gunitsky suggests that the case of RuNet 
illustrates a ‘“shift from contestation to co-optation” of social media’.87  
State control is not a new thing in Russian cyberspace, although RuNet 
enjoyed relative freedom compared to the Internet in authoritarian environments. 
Following the elections, a significant increase in Internet regulation could be 
observed, which can also be linked to the Arab Spring and the Snowden 
revelations.88 This took the form of the sovereignization of control over the Internet, 
that is, the type and the scale of control over online space became more and more 
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like the control exercised over offline space. In addition to new legislation, the 
oppositional media was either blocked by inclusion on a blacklist or taken under 
state control (e.g. the popular news website Lenta.ru), while state-sponsored media 
played an increasingly dominant role online. Several influential platforms were taken 
under state control through changes in the ownership structure of the media in 
general. The state also supported groups of cyber guards, who search for prohibited 
content online and report it to the authorities.89 
Traditional offline elites, including the media elites, increasingly took control of 
online space. It with worth noting that the majority of Russians support Internet 
regulation and trust state institutions as regulators.90 These developments gave rise 
to new RuNet elites: the regulators, for example, the security services and 
RoskomNadzor, a state’s communication control agency, which shapes the agenda 
and sets the tone for what is permitted and what is prohibited. The shift in Internet 
elites is also reflected in the changes of the type of participant invited to a meeting 
with the Russian president as representatives of the Internet from users and activists 
(who were invited to meet President Medvedev in 2011) to the owners and 
managers of Russia’s IT-industry (who were invited to meet President Putin in 2015).  
 In addition to regulation and sovereignization, the fifth stage of RuNet 
development displays evidence of the increasing securitization of Russian online 
space. These tendencies had been visible in RuNet since the cyber conflict with 
Estonia in 2007, which included a large-scale attack on Estonian governmental 
websites that were attributed to Russian hackers, and the war between Russia and 
Georgia in 2008. The Internet played an even greater role in information warfare 
during the conflict between Russian and Ukraine (2014-2016). This securitization of 
RuNet elevated traditional security elites to the level of traditional political, business 
and media elites (see Kiriya’s article in this issue). 
To sum up, this most recent stage in the development of RuNet is associated 
with the state’s response to the increasing role of the Internet in social and political 
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mobilization. Regulation of online space substantially increased; state-affiliated 
political, security, and media elites have penetrated online space, and the role of 
online space for agenda setting and activism has decreased. The dominant 
imaginaries associated with RuNet are those of sovereignization and securitization. 
The former elites are contained in platforms like Facebook, which present a space 
for ‘echo chambers’, while the platforms for previous elites have either been co-
opted, taken under control or restricted through regulation. That said, the former 
elites still endeavour to promote their vision of the Internet through the development 
of new tools, practices and the generation of content.  
 
Conclusion 
We proposed a conceptual framework that would trace the development of 
RuNet by focusing on the actors associated with the dominant imaginaries of 
Russian cyberspace at different periods of time. We defined these actors as Internet 
elites; that is, the key actors to have participated in the social construction of the 
Internet and in the promotion of dominant Internet imaginaries. We also said that we 
would consider the conflict between different types of actors associated with different 
types of imaginaries.  
We identified five stages in the development of RuNet which are associated 
with different types of elites, different imaginaries, different types of relationships 
between elites and platforms dominant in the context of a specific imaginary. The 
following table presents a summary of this analysis. 
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Internet 
imaginary 
Timeline Dominant actors Type of actors Relationship 
between actors 
Dominant 
platforms 
1.Era of geeks/ 
scientists 
1985-
1995  
Scientists, 
programmers 
Developers Unchallenged 
leadership 
newsgroups; 
BBS; FidoNet 
2. Alternative 
cultural space 
1995-
2003 
Creative class: 
writers, poets, 
journalist, 
humanitarians 
Users (early 
adopters/ 
experimenters) 
Unchallenged 
leadership 
Web pages 
3. Public 
Sphere/ 
Alternative 
media space 
2003-
2009 
Newsmakers, 
journalists, popular 
bloggers, celebrities 
Users/ content-
generators 
Tension with 
traditional 
media elites 
Blogosphere 
4. Political/ 
social 
mobilization  
2010-
2012 
Volunteers, social/ 
political activists 
Users/ 
Innovators 
Tension with 
political/ 
security elites 
Social 
networks 
5. Regulation/ 
sovereignization
/ securitization 
2013- 
present 
Roskomnadzor; 
cyber guards; 
security, media & 
political elites 
 
Regulators 
 Domination  
Online 
platforms 
under 
regulation;  
circumvention 
tools; black list 
Table 2 Stages in development of RuNet imaginaries. 
To follow the circulation of Internet elites and the dynamics of change in the 
Internet imaginaries, we looked into three aspects: the type of actors associated with 
dominant Internet imaginaries; the type of resources that are mobilized by actors; 
and the type of relationships between the actors. Although the first and the last 
stages were driven by actors with institutional affiliation, research institutes and 
political institutions present very different types of institutional actors. In the three 
middle stages, we can see that the imaginaries are mostly associated with individual 
actors. We can also trace a shift from imaginaries associated with online space 
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developers to user-driven imaginaries. The final stage shows an imaginary driven by 
institutional regulators. 
The analysis of data also allows us to establish whether given elites originated 
from an offline space or if they emerged online. In the case of the scientists, these 
are epistemic communities which existed offline and, as the architects of the new 
environment, took part in the development of the online space. In the case of the 
next three stages we can see a combination of online and offline elites. For instance, 
at the second stage, cultural elites from an offline background form a new type of 
identity online and become more empowered in the online space through 
maintaining exclusive networks. The third stage consisted of a combination of 
existing online elites and individual actors associated with offline elites trying to 
adopt online space. The stage of mobilization meant that elites formed online rely on 
their capacity to use digital platforms in order to facilitate offline action.  
The online elites can be also classified according to the resources that are 
mobilized to develop and implement a particular type of imaginary. In the case of the 
scientist and developers their major resources are knowledge and technology. The 
way they implemented their imaginaries is through a combination of technical 
development of online space and usage of this space. The imaginaries at the second 
and third stages were implemented by drawing on the social and cultural capital of 
the actors. These actors shaped RuNet through their online practices, such as 
content generation and networking. The fourth stage revolves around social capital 
and its political mobilization, or more specifically, something that has been 
conceptualized as ‘crowd capital’ as well as innovation that relies on knowledge and 
creativity.91 The implementation of the dominant imaginary of the latest fifth stage 
relies on the traditional institutional power of the state, which is achieved through 
domination and governance. The origins of resources are linked to the origins of the 
actors. Some of the resources, e.g. knowledge and traditional political power, stem 
from offline domains. The resources that are associated with the three middle stages 
accumulated mostly online. Hence, the transition of imaginaries is linked to a change 
in the structure of resources that are mobilized to promote these imaginaries.  
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Our analysis suggests that the shift in the imaginaries of RuNet is associated 
with a relationship of power between different Internet elites. We could not identify 
any substantial tensions or conflicts between the different actors at the first two 
stages of RuNet development. The third stage is the first when tensions between 
online elites and traditional offline media elites emerged. The online space is 
nevertheless strongly shaped by online actors. The fourth stage showed tensions 
between online oppositional elites and traditional offline political elites. The latest 
stage indicates domination by traditional offline political institutions, as well as 
traditional media and security elites 
The shift in the type of online elites that takes place in the social construction 
of the Internet from developers through users and towards state-affiliated institutional 
actors can be used as the basis for a model for the transformation of the Internet as 
an alternative socio-political space. First, the space was created relying on the 
resources of knowledge. At the second stage the new domain was inhabited by first 
adopters, who sought to develop the space as an alternative to where they had 
come from. Then the space started to be a field of contest between those who were 
interested in preserving it as an alternative space and those who tried to adjust this 
space to fit in with existent offline reality. At some point, those who promoted 
alternative visions of cyberspace space try to move from online to offline space, and 
accordingly alter the offline space by relying on online technologies. However, that 
leads to a crackdown by offline reality on the opposition in the online domain, which 
is manifested in what we have described as the sovereignization and securitization 
of cyberspace.  
It needs be stressed that there is no clear differentiation between stages, and 
at every point of time there can be found a complex mixture of relationships, actors, 
resources and imaginaries. That said, the stages that we have identified enable the 
dynamics of the relationship between online space as an alternative space and the 
offline space as we described above to be traced. It is also important to highlight that 
while we have used RuNet as a case study to follow the role of online elites in the 
construction of the social-political and cultural segment of the Internet, the model can 
be also applied to other segments of the global Internet as an outcome of social 
construction and relationships of power between different actors.  
Our paper suggests a starting point for further examination of the 
historiography of RuNet as well as the historiography of other cultural and socio-
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political segments of the Internet. Future research should also address a number of 
methodological and empirical limitations that have been indicated in our paper. For 
instance, our analysis neglected economic factors and the role of business elites that 
can be associated with any stage of RuNet development. Further analysis could also 
focus on the identification of latent imaginaries that have the potential to turn into 
dominant imaginaries in the future. That said, we sought to demonstrate that the 
‘unique destiny’ of RuNet has its own internal logic. Exploring this logic enriches our 
understanding of the history of the Internet on local and global levels.  
